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Abstract Children with congenital visual impairment
have been reported to be delayed in theory of mind
development. So far, research focused on first-order theory
of mind, and included mainly blind children, whereas the
majority of visually impaired children is not totally blind.
The present study set out to explore whether children with
a broader range of congenital visual impairments have a
delay in more advanced theory of mind understanding, in
particular second-order theory of mind (i.e. awareness that
other people have beliefs about beliefs) and non-literal
language (e.g. irony or figure of speech). Twenty-four
children with congenital visual impairment and 24 typi-
cally developing sighted children aged between 6 and 13
were included. All children were presented with a series of
stories involving understanding of theory of mind and non-
literal language. When compared with sighted children of
similar age and verbal intelligence, performance of chil-
dren with congenital visual impairment on advanced theory
of mind and non-literal stories was alike. The ability to
understand the motivations behind non-literal language
was associated with age, verbal intelligence and theory of
mind skills, but was not associated with visual ability.
Keywords Visual impairment  Children  Pragmatic
language  Advanced theory of mind  Non-literal stories
Introduction
Some children with congenital visual impairment have a
delay in theory of mind development (Brambring and
Asbrock 2010; Green et al. 2004; McAlpine and Moore
1995; Minter et al. 1998; Peterson et al. 2000). Theory of
mind refers to the ability to attribute mental states like
intentions, beliefs, and desires to oneself and other people
as a means to interpret and predict behavior. Theory of
mind understanding is usually investigated by first-order
false belief tasks, which examine whether a child can
reason about the way in which people will act when
holding a mistaken belief. For example, in the standard
Sally-Ann task, a doll Sally puts a marble in her basket
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). While Sally is away, another
doll called Ann takes out Sally’s marble and puts it into her
box. When Sally returns, she wants to play with her marble.
The child is then asked where Sally will look for her marble.
The correct answer is that Sally will look in her basket, but
young children often report their own belief that Sally will
look into the box, and thus failing to take into account that
Sally has a false belief about the location of the marble.
Typically, successful performance on first-order false belief
tasks begins to emerge in children aged between 3 and
5 years (Wellman and Liu 2004; Wellman et al. 2001).
In children with congenital blindness or profound visual
impairment, several studies have found a developmental
delay in first-order false belief performance compared to
typically developing children. However, the number of
visually impaired children who are delayed and the age of
theory of mind acquisition differed widely across studies,
varying from age 7 to 12 years (Brambring and Asbrock
2010; Green et al. 2004; McAlpine and Moore 1995;
Minter et al. 1998; Peterson et al. 2000; Roch-Levecq
2006). Brambring and Asbrock (2010) argued that the
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delayed onset of false belief performance might be due to
visual components associated with previous false belief
tasks. To overcome this potential confounding effect of
visual components they constructed alternative false belief
tasks where the role of vision is minimal. Using these
alternative tasks Brambring and Asbrock (2010) found a
delay in theory of mind development of at most 2 years.
Specifically, by the age of 7, congenitally blind children
were able to solve the alternative false belief tasks.
Delays in theory of mind development in visually
impaired children have been attributed to a lack of access
to visual information during interactions, like joint atten-
tion, mutual gaze, face expressions, and gestures (Green
et al. 2004; Peterson et al. 2000; McAlpine and Moore
1995; Tadic´ et al. 2010; Pring et al. 1998). This kind of
visual information is important for social communication
as well. In line with this, children with congenital visual
impairment have been shown to have difficulties with the
use of language for pragmatic and social purposes, while
structural language (e.g. articulation, grammar, vocabu-
lary) was good or even superior (James and Stojanovik
2007; Tadic´ et al. 2010). This pattern of delay in socio-
cognitive and socio-communicative development found in
children with congenital visual impairment is also a core
feature of sighted children with autism, and it has been
suggested that children with congenital visual impairment
are at risk of developing autism (Brown et al. 1997; Hob-
son and Bishop 2003; Hobson et al. 1999; Parr et al. 2010).
So far, research has focused on first-order theory of
mind in visually impaired children, and most studies
included only blind children, whereas the majority of
visually impaired children is not totally blind. The present
study set out to explore whether children with a broader
range of congenital visual impairments have a delay in
more advanced theory of mind understanding.
Advanced theory of mind can be examined by second-
order false belief tasks. Second-order belief concerns the
awareness that other people have beliefs about beliefs (e.g.
Peter thinks that Ann thinks that the cake is in the drawer),
whereas first-order belief refers to the awareness that other
people have beliefs about a situation (e.g. Ann thinks that
the cake is in the drawer). The ability to attribute second-
order beliefs is considered to be required for more complex
forms of social interaction and communication (Miller
2009; Filippova and Astington 2008; Caillies and Le
Sourn-Bissaoui 2008; Perner and Wimmer 1985). The
understanding of second-order mental states develops at a
later age than first-order belief, usually between the ages 5
and 8 years (Miller 2009).
Another method to investigate advanced theory of
mind is to examine non-literal language understanding.
Non-literal language can be considered as part of prag-
matics—that is, the use of language in communication—
and encompasses, for instance, jokes, irony, sarcasm, fig-
ures of speech, lies and white lies. In non-literal language,
the motivations behind an utterance diverge from the literal
content. For example, someone saying that he loves the
birthday present he received, may really love the birthday
present or may be just polite and spare the giver’s feelings.
Comprehension of the underlying intention of a non-literal
utterance requires the attribution of mental states to another,
and hence can be considered as a subtler test of theory of
mind understanding (Happe´ 1994). Several studies have
shown that both children and adults with autism have dif-
ficulty with identifying accurately the motivation behind a
character’s non-literal utterance in everyday stories (Happe´
1994; Kaland et al. 2008, 2002; Brent et al. 2004; Jolliffe
and Baron-Cohen 1999; White et al. 2009), and that per-
formance on theory of mind tasks is associated with non-
literal language comprehension (Happe´ 1993; White et al.
2009). Moreover, one study demonstrated that children with
visual impairment, like children and adults with autism,
provided fewer context-appropriate mental state explana-
tions for non-literal utterances than sighted controls (Pring
et al. 1998). They suggested that there is a subtle difference
between visually impaired children and sighted children in
the use of language that requires insight into underlying
intentions.
To date, little research has been dedicated to sophisticated
theory of mind reasoning in children with congenital visual
impairments (Pring et al. 1998; Roch-Levecq 2006). Addi-
tionally, as outlined above, most research has focused on
blind children, whereas the majority of visually impaired
children is not totally blind. In order to warrant ecological
validity, it is important to investigate whether children with
varying congenital visual impairments experience problems
with (advanced) theory of mind reasoning. Moreover, it is
important to determine whether there is a delay in pragmatic
development in young as well as older children with visual
impairments, as older children might catch up a possible
delay. In brief, the central research question of the present
study was: Do children with a broad range of congenital
visual impairments—young children as well as older chil-
dren—show a delay in advanced theory of mind develop-
ment? To provide an answer to this question, we examined
how visually impaired children (aged 6–13 years) with
varying congenital visual impairments perform on
(advanced) theory of mind reasoning and non-literal lan-
guage comprehension compared to control children. More-
over, we examined whether task performance was related to
visual acuity within the visually impaired group, as the extent
of visual input (i.e. amount of vision) may play a mediating
role. The purpose of this study was to provide a better insight
into the relation between visual input and pragmatic devel-
opment, that is, understanding of theory of mind and non-
literal language.




Initially, a total group of 54 children between 6 and
13 years of age participated in this study. There were 30
children with a congenital visual impairment (VI), who
were recruited from 4 special education schools for visu-
ally impaired children. Six children with a visual impair-
ment were excluded from data analysis. One child was
excluded because he received a diagnosis of autism spec-
trum disorder during the study, and another child was
excluded because he was not testable due to attention
problems. The other 4 children were excluded because their
visual acuity was above 0.3 Snellen decimals. Hence, the
VI group included 24 children. The control group consisted
of 24 typically developing sighted children, who were
recruited from local schools. All children had Dutch as
their native language. Children with a diagnosis of autism
spectrum disorder, cerebral visual impairment, severe
hearing impairment, intellectual disability, or physical
impairment were excluded. The groups were matched on
gender, age, and verbal IQ. Participant characteristics are
shown in Table 1. See ‘‘Appendix A’’ for individual
diagnoses and visual acuities.
Materials
Theory of Mind
Theory of mind understanding was tested by different
tasks, including two unexpected contents tasks, two first-
order false belief stories, and two second-order false belief
stories. See ‘‘Appendix B’’ for the complete stories and
questions.
For the unexpected content tasks, each child was pre-
sented with an egg carton and asked what they thought
what was in the egg carton (Peterson et al. 2000;
Brambring and Asbrock 2010). After the child’s response,
the egg carton was opened to reveal a set of bouncy balls.
Next, the egg carton was closed and the child was asked
two questions. First, what the child thought what was in the
egg carton before it was opened (own false belief) and what
was really in there (control question). Second, what a
friend of the child would think what is in the egg carton
(other false belief). In the other unexpected content task,
the child was shown six wooden boxes that were covered
(Brambring and Asbrock 2010). The boxes contained the
following objects in sequence: lego cube—tea spoon—lego
cube—tea spoon—lego cube—clothes peg. After box 3, the
child was asked for each box what he would expect to find
in the next box. In the final box, the content is unexpected
on the basis of the previous content. After the unexpected
content was revealed, the child was asked what he thought
what was in the final box before he had opened it (own
false belief), and what was really in there (control ques-
tion). Second, the child was asked what a friend of the child
would think what is in the final box (other false belief) if he
would do the same task. In both unexpected content tasks,
the objects could be recognized by touch, and hence the
role of vision was minimal. The child was credited 1 point
for a correct own false belief, and 1 point for a correct other
false belief. The maximum total score for these two tasks
was 4 points.
The first-order false belief stories were based on the
classical Sally-Ann task (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985). The
children listened to two stories where an object or person
changed location in the absence of another person. The
crucial question was where this person will look for the
object or person. The child received 1 point for a correct
answer and 1 point if the child could provide a right
explanation why the person would think that the object or
person was at that location. The maximum total score for
these two tasks was 4 points.
The two second-order false belief stories involved a
change of location of an object or a person. Two story’s
characters have witnessed this change of location, but they
Table 1 Participant
characteristics
a Visual acuity of the best eye
in Snellen decimals
n.a. not available
VI group (n = 24) Control group (n = 24) Group comparison
Gender (M:F) (11:13) (11:13)
Age (years, months)
Mean (SD) 10.2 (2.0) 9.6 (1.4) t(46) = -1.34 p [ .10
Range 6.7–13.2 6.3–11.10
Verbal IQ (WISC-III)
Mean (SD) 101 (12) 107 (16) t(46) = 1.74 p = .089
Range 78–129 75–136
Visual acuitya
Mean (SD) 0.11 (0.09) n.a.
Range 0–0.3 n.a.
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are ignorant of each other’s knowledge (Astington et al.
2002; Perner and Wimmer 1985). Here the child was given
1 point for a correct answer, and 2 points for a justification
in terms of mental states (e.g. ‘‘Because she does not know
that Joris met the ice-cream man’’) and 1 point for an
explanation without referring to mental states (e.g. ‘‘The
ice-cream man was in the park before’’). The maximum
total score for the second-order false belief stories was 6
points.
In all tasks, children were asked control questions to
ensure that they understood the task or story. Because a
correct answer on the false belief question, but no correct
answer on the control questions, could be due to guessing,
such responses were excluded from analysis and treated as
missing values. In total, there were 6 missing values at the
second-order false belief task (3 in VI group, 3 in control
group).
Non-literal Stories
The non-literal language task comprised 10 short stories in
Dutch about everyday situations (see ‘‘Appendix C’’ for
examples). The stories were based on the Strange Stories
by Happe´ (1994), but adapted to typical Dutch situations,
and constructed so that they did not appeal solely to visual
experience. There were five types of stories, and two
examples of each story type, including lies, white lies,
jokes, figure of speech, and irony or sarcasm. The non-
literal stories were followed by two questions. The first
question had the form ‘‘Is it true what X said? Did X really
Y?’’ to check comprehension. The second question
involved a justification and had the form ‘‘Why did X say
that?’’ A child could receive 1 point for the first question,
as the first step in understanding non-literal language, is
recognizing the non-literal content. For the second ques-
tion, a child could receive 2 points for a fully correct
explanation, 1 point for a partially correct explanation, and
0 points for an incorrect explanation (O’Hare et al. 2009).
For instance, in one of the lie stories, the child received 2
points for a fully correct mental explanation (‘‘He is afraid
that his mother becomes angry at him’’), 1 point for a
partially correct mental explanation (‘‘He does not like that
the vase has been broken’’), and 0 points if he gave a
physical explanation (‘‘The vase has been broken’’), or a
wrong mental state explanation (‘‘He is joking’’). In case of
the jokes, the utterances could also be interpreted as a
simile (e.g. ‘‘The dog is big like an elephant’’; ‘‘The kittens
are hairy like balls of wool’’), and therefore such responses
were credited with 1 point. The maximum score for each
story type was 6 points, and for the complete set of stories
30 points. Finally, a control story was added that assessed
the ability to make a causal inference.
Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC-2 NL)
The Dutch version of Children’s Communication Check-
list-2 (CCC-2 NL) was used to evaluate language and
communication skills (Geurts 2007; Bishop 2003), as they
may be important for theory of mind performance and non-
literal language understanding. The CCC-2 is a standard-
ized questionnaire for children from 4 to 15 years of age,
and is completed by parents. The checklist contains 70
items that are grouped into 10 scales: (A) speech, (B) syn-
tax, (C) semantics, (D) coherence, (E) inappropriate initi-
ation, (F) stereotyped language, (G) use of context,
(H) non-verbal communication, (I) social relations and
(J) interests. Scores on individual subscales are converted
to age-scaled standard scores with mean of 10 and SD of 3,
based on a norm group of 2,580 Dutch children between 4
and 16 years of age.
For this study, we computed two composite scores: the
General Communication Score (sum of standard scores on
scales A to H) and the Pragmatics Score (sum of standard
scores on scales E to H). Higher scores on the CCC-2
subscales and composite scores indicate more difficulties.
Procedure
Informed consent from the children’s parents was obtained
prior to participation in the study. Each child was tested
individually in a quiet room at school. For children from
whom verbal intelligence scores were not available, verbal
intelligence was measured using the Wechsler Intelligence
Scales for Children-III-NL (Kort et al. 2005). The CCC-2 was
sent to parents to complete at home. In total, 4 parents did not
complete the CCC-2, of whom 3 were from the VI group.
All stories were pre-recorded such that prosody and
speed of speech were alike for each participant. Non-literal
utterances were uttered in an appropriate voice, e.g. ironic
remarks had a typically ironic voice. The participants first
received the non-literal stories, and after that the theory of
mind tasks were administered. All stories, including the
first- and second order theory of mind stories, were audi-
torily presented from a laptop. The stories were presented
in two different orders. If children provided no answer or
an inappropriate answer, a prompt question was given to
elicit a response.
For consistency among scoring, an answer protocol was
made in advance with possible answers and their corre-
sponding credits. Two persons administered the tests. All
responses were rated by them together. To examine the
inter-rater reliability, another person not involved in the
experiment, acted as second rater. The inter-rater reliability
was k = 0.80 (p \ .001) for the non-literal stories and
k = 0.89 (p \ .001) for the theory of mind tasks.
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Data Analysis
Participants were divided in a group of younger children
(6–9 years, n = 26), and older children (10–13 years,
n = 22). For each participant, a sum score was calculated
for the non-literal stories and for the different theory of
mind tasks (ToM). Because a child could receive 6 points
for the second order tasks, but 4 points for the other theory
of mind tasks, the sum scores for the unexpected content
tasks and first order theory of mind tasks were weighted by
multiplying with a factor of 1.5.
The sum score for the non-literal stories was entered into
an ANOVA with Group (control, VI) and Age (young, old)
as between-subject factors. The sum scores for the theory
of mind tasks were entered into a MANOVA with ToM (1st
order, 2nd order) as within-subject factor and Group (con-
trol, VI) and Age (young, old) as between-subject factors.
For the control story, a non-parametric Mann–Whitney test
was used, because these data strongly deviated from a
normal distribution. A Pearson’s correlation was calculated
between the experimental tasks to check whether these
tasks are associated with each other. Moreover, to find out
whether the amount of vision played a mediating role, we
computed correlations between the experimental tasks and
visual acuity. Finally, the composite scores on the CCC-2
were analyzed by computing ANOVA’s, and the standard
scores on the subscales were analyzed by a MANOVA. For
all comparisons, p values smaller than 0.05 were consid-
ered significant, and p values larger than 0.10 were
reported as non-significant (abbreviated to n.s.).
Results
Experimental Tasks
Tables 2 and 3 show the mean scores on the theory of mind
tasks and the non-literal stories.
For the unexpected content task, all control children
received the maximum score of 4 points, and 2 visually
impaired children received 1 or 2 points, and 3 visually
impaired children received 3 points (note that in Tables 2,
3, the weighted sum scores are reported). Because of a total
lack of variance in the control group, we left the unex-
pected content task out of statistical analysis.
A MANOVA on first and second order theory of mind
scores showed no effect for Group (F(2,37) = 1.06, p [ .10),
but there was a significant effect for Age (F(2,37) = 6.49,
p = .004) with an overall better performance for the older
children than the younger children, in particular for the first-
order false belief task (F(1,38) = 12.2, p = .001), and a trend
for the second-order false belief task (F(1,38) = 3.36,
p = .075). There was no significant interaction of Group by
Age (F(2,37) \ 1, p [ .10).
An ANOVA on the non-literal stories scores revealed no
significant effect for Group (F(1,44) \ 1, p [ .10), but there
was a significant effect for Age (F(1,44) = 14.1, p = .001)
with a higher performance on non-literal stories for the older
children than the younger children. There was no significant
interaction of Group by Age (F(1,44) \ 1, p [ .10). For the
control story involving a causal inference, a non-parametric
Mann–Whitney test demonstrated neither an effect for the
Group (U = 288, p [ .10) nor for Age (U = 282, p [ .10).
There was a positive relationship between performance
on non-literal stories and theory of mind tasks (r = 0.58,
p \ .001). However, performance on non-literal stories as
well as on theory of mind tasks was not associated with
visual acuity in the VI group (both p [ .10).
Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC-2 NL)
There was no significant difference between the visually
impaired group and control group on the composite score
General Communication (F(1,42) = 2.39, p [ .10), but the
composite score Pragmatics showed a trend that just failed
to reach conventional levels of statistical significance
(F(1,42) = 3.79, p = .058). A MANOVA on the standard
scores of the subscales also revealed a trend for Group
(F(10,33) = 1.89, p = .083). The groups differed on the
subscales ‘‘Non-verbal communication’’ (F(1,42) = 7.63,
p = .008), and ‘‘Inappropriate initiation’’ (F(1,42) = 6.97,
Table 2 Mean scores for the visually impaired group and the control
group
Tasks Mean (SD)
VI group Control group
Unexpected content ToM (weighted) 5.5 (1.1) 6 (0)
1st order ToM (weighted) 4.4 (1.7) 4.2 (2.0)
2nd order ToM 3.1 (2.1) 2.0 (1.8)
Total score ToM (weighted) 13.4 (2.9) 12.1 (3.3)
Total score Non-literal stories 24.0 (3.9) 23.7 (3.6)








5.7 (1.0) 5.8 (0.7)
1st order ToM (weighted) 3.5 (1.8) 5.3 (1.3)
2nd order ToM 1.9 (1.9) 3.2 (1.9)
Total score ToM (weighted) 11.2 (3.0) 14.3 (2.5)
Total score Non-literal stories 22.2 (3.5) 25.8 (2.9)
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p = .012), see also Table 4. Note that the mean standard
scores across the CCC-2 subscales remained within normal
range limits (mean = 10, SD = 3).
Discussion
This study explored whether children (aged 6–13 years)
with varying congenital visual impairments show a delayed
development in advanced theory of mind. More specifically,
we examined the understanding of first-order and second-
order theory of mind as well as non-literal language.
Because previous research has found that children with
congenital blindness or profound visual impairment are later
at developing a theory of mind (Brambring and Asbrock
2010; Green et al. 2004; McAlpine and Moore 1995; Minter
et al. 1998; Peterson et al. 2000; Roch-Levecq 2006), we
hypothesized that more advanced theory of mind under-
standing might be delayed as well. However, this hypothesis
was not confirmed. When compared with sighted children
who were matched on age and verbal intelligence, children
with varying congenital visual impairment had a similar
performance on advanced theory of mind stories and
non-literal stories. In both groups, older children (aged
10–13 years) had a better performance on the theory of mind
tasks and non-literal stories than younger children (aged
6–9 years). That is, we did not find evidence for a delay in
advanced theory of mind development in visually impaired
children. Moreover, within the visually impaired group, the
degree of visual acuity loss did not appear to play a role on
task performance.
The current findings seem to be in contrast with previous
research on theory of mind in children with visual
impairments. For instance, McAlpine and Moore (1995)
found that the severity of visual impairment affects per-
formance on a false belief task. However, it has to be noted
that McAlpine and Moore (1995) used tactile theory of
mind tasks only. We argue that the divergent findings
might be explained by the kind of task that was used:
tactile versus verbal tasks. The current results showed that
some visually impaired children had difficulty with the
unexpected content task, which was a relatively simple task
that should be solved by touch or vision. Whereas all
control children received the maximum score, 21% of the
children with a visual impairment did not. It is this kind
of tactile tasks that is often used to investigate first-
order theory of mind in children with visual impair-
ment (Brambring and Asbrock 2010; Green et al. 2004;
McAlpine and Moore 1995; Minter et al. 1998; Peterson
et al. 2000). Therefore, delays in theory of mind that have
been found may be—at least partly—due to task-related
factors (Brambring and Asbrock 2010).
Except for the unexpected content task, all tasks inclu-
ded auditorily presented stories. The processing of such
stories may place a high demand on working memory
capacity. That is, verbal information such as story char-
acters, plot and story events have to be kept in memory
until the questions are asked, and participants need to
actively use the story information. One possible explana-
tion for the current findings is that visually impaired chil-
dren are superior in processing auditory information
compared to control children. In line with this, it has been
found that blind people have a better memory for auditory
verbal information (Hull and Mason 1995; Raz et al. 2007;
Roder et al. 2001; Swanson and Luxenberg 2009; Edmonds
and Pring 2006). Moreover, Tadic et al. (2010) showed that
children with visual impairment were superior at recalling
sentences, which also points to a verbal memory
advantage.
Our finding that children with visual impairment per-
formed similar on non-literal language comprehension as
sighted children, seems to be at odds with Pring et al.
(1998). They found that visually impaired children identi-
fied less accurately the motivation behind a character’s
non-literal utterance in everyday stories (Pring et al. 1998).
However, this discrepancy among findings may have two
reasons. First, Pring et al. (1998) included only blind or
profoundly visually impaired children. Second, they
included more different story types, including persuasion,
misunderstanding, contrary emotions, and double bluff.
Such non-literal language is likely to be more difficult than
most story types used in our study (O’Hare et al. 2009).
Therefore, one should be cautious when comparing
findings.
Table 4 Mean scores on the Dutch version of the CCC-2 composite
scores and subscales (standard scores)
CCC-2 Mean (SD)
VI group Control group
General communication score 90.1 (19.4) 81.4 (18.1)
Pragmatics score 47.1 (10.3) 41.2 (9.9)
A. speech 10.0 (3.1) 9.7 (2.9)
B. syntax 10.6 (3.5) 10.0 (3.2)
C. semantics 11.0 (2.7) 10.4 (2.9)
D. coherence 11.3 (3.1) 10.0 (3.1)
E. inappropriate initiation 12.0 (2.8) 9.4 (3.5)
F. stereotyped language 11.2 (3.1) 9.9 (2.4)
G. use of context 11.3 (3.6) 12.0 (3.4)
H. non-verbal communication 12.5 (3.3) 9.9 (3.3)
I. social relations 10.8 (3.3) 10.0 (3.3)
J. interests 11.4 (3.0) 11.0 (2.5)
Note that higher scores indicate more difficulties. For standard scores,
mean = 10, SD = 3
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The current results indicate that children with congenital
visual impairment—despite a limited access to visual infor-
mation during interactions (e.g. joint attention, mutual gaze,
facial expressions, and gestures)—can develop an effective
theory of mind. However, these findings do not imply that
those children do not experience any difficulties with prag-
matics. Theory of mind and non-literal language involve only
a small portion of pragmatics. Our evaluations of language
and communication skills by means of the CCC-2 at least
suggests that visually impaired children may have problems
with other aspects of pragmatics, in particular, initialization of
conversation and non-verbal communication. These aspects
of pragmatics perhaps rely more directly on visual informa-
tion such as eye contact and facial expressions than non-literal
language. Such aspects of pragmatics would provide a direc-
tion for further research.
A limitation of this study is the relatively large group of
older children, in particular for the most severely visually
impaired children. Therefore, it is possible that we could
have missed an early delay in theory of mind development.
Still, it is remarkable that even with limited access to visual
information during interactions, like joint attention, mutual
gaze, face expressions, and gestures, children with con-
genital visual impairment can develop an effective theory
of mind. In line with our findings, it has been found that
congenitally blind adults acquire a typical theory of mind
brain network, despite absence of visual experience during
development (Bedny et al. 2009). One way to compensate
for a limited access to visual information during interaction
might be a stronger reliance on language (Bedny et al.
2009; Brambring and Asbrock 2010). It is therefore con-
ceivable, that the visually impaired children in the present
study have developed an effective theory of mind by using
language as a major source of information to compensate
for a lack of vision. Future research needs to be conducted
to test this claim. Finally, because of large heterogeneity in
etiology within the group of visually impaired children,
longitudinal research may give more insight into the indi-
vidual trajectories in social-cognitive development.
Conclusion
The present findings showed that, when using appropriate,
verbal tasks, children with a variety of congenital visual
impairments had no developmental delay in more advanced
theory of mind understanding. Despite a limited access to
visual information during interactions (e.g. joint attention,
mutual gaze, facial expressions, and gestures), children
with congenital visual impairment can develop an effective
theory of mind.
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Appendix A
See Table 5.
Table 5 Clinical characteristics of individual children with visual impairment
No Age (years) Gender Visual acuitya Visual impairment
1 6.6 m 0.05 Albinism
2 7.1 f 0.05 Iris coloboma; hydrocephalus; microphthalmus
3 7.3 f 0.12 Albinism
4 7.4 f 0.25 Aniridia; nystagmus
5 8.2 f 0.16 Achromatopsia
6 8.5 m 0.125 High hypermetropia
7 8.5 m 0.25 Congenital cataract, amblyopia
8 8.8 m 0.08 Retinal scarring after herpes infection
9 8.8 m 0.06 Nystagmus
10 9.6 f 0.3 Albinism
11 10.1 m 0.04 Persistent hyperplastic primary vitreous (PHPV)
12 10.8 m 0.18 Albinism
13 10.8 f 0.05 Tapetoretinal dystrophy (TRD)
14 11.0 f 0.25 Albinism; nystagmus
15 11.3 f 0.16 Congenital cataract
16 11.4 m 0.12 Macular hypoplasia




Table 6 Theory of mind stories
Theory of
mind
Stories (translated from Dutch) Questions
1st order
false belief
Tom and Lotte are playing in the class room. Tim needs to go to the toilet and is
leaving the class room. Lotte does not like to play on her own and is going to the
kitchen to get a glass of lemonade. When Tim comes back from the toilet, he wants
to play again with Lotte.
(1) Where is Tom going to play again
with Lotte?
(2) Why does Tim go there?
Control questions:
Where did he see Lotte the last time?
Where is Lotte now?
Bob and Roos are playing upstairs. Bob is playing with his favorite marble. Then the
telephone is ringing downstairs. He puts his marble in his marbles pouch onto the
floor. When he is downstairs, Roos sneaks Bob’s favorite marble out of his marbles
pouch and hides the marble in her trouser pocket. After a few minutes, Bob returns
and he wants to play again with his favorite marble.
(1) Where will Bob look first for his
marble?
(2) Why will Bob look first there?
Control questions:
Where did Bob put the marble when we
went downstairs?
Where is the marble now?
2nd order
false belief
Janneke en Marloes are playing in Marloes’ room. Marloes has a letter from her
friend Bram. Janneke really wants to know what is written in the letter but Marloes
does not want her to read it. Marloes’ mom calls her. She puts the letter under the
blankets of her bed, and leaves the room. While Marloes is gone, Janneke takes the
letter and reads it sneakily. Then she puts it away in Marloes’ desk. When Marloes
comes back, she sees Janneke putting the letter in the desk, but Janneke does not
notice that Marloes has seen her putting the letter in the desk.
… Later on, Marloes says to Janneke, ‘‘OK, you may the read letter.’’ And she goes
to get the letter.
(1) Where does Janneke think Marloes
will look for her letter?
(2) Why does Janneke think this?
Control questions:
Does Janneke know that Marloes saw
her?
Where did Marloes put her letter before
she went to see her mom?
Where is the letter now?
Does Marloes know where the letter is
now?
Joris and Inge are in the park. In the park there is an ice-cream van. Joris would like
to buy an ice-cream for both, but he has left his money at home. The ice-cream man
says: ‘‘You can fetch your money at home. I’ll be here in the park all
afternoon.’’Joris goes home to fetch his money. Meanwhile, Inge is waiting for him
at the ice-cream van. The ice-cream man changed his mind en says to Inge: ‘‘I will
no longer stay in the park, I am going to drive my van to the market square.’’ The
ice-cream man drives over to the market square. On his way, he meets Joris and
tells him that he’s going to drive his van to the market square. Meanwhile, Inge is
going to Joris’ home to pick him up. When she arrives at his home, his mother tells
her he is gone to buy an ice-cream.
(1) Where does Inge think Joris is going
to buy an ice-cream?
(2) Why does she think he has
gone there?
Control questions:
Does Inge know that Joris met the ice-
cream man?
Does Joris know where the ice-cream
man is now? Where is he now?
Table 5 continued
No Age (years) Gender Visual acuitya Visual impairment
17 11.5 f 0.05 Retinopathy of prematurity (ROP)
18 11.7 m 0.1 Nystagmus, achromatopsia
19 11.7 f 0.12 Microphtalmus
20 11.8 m 0 Crouzon syndrome
21 11.9 f 0 Tapetoretinal dystrophy (TRD)
22 12.3 m 0 Leber’s congenital amaurosis (LCA)
23 13.2 f 0.05 Retinoblastoma
24 13.2 f 0.08 Nervus opticus atrophy
a Visual acuity of (corrected) best eye in Snellen decimals
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